The Summary Jury Trial and Toxic Tort Litigation by Wenderoth, Stephen J.
Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 6
Issue 2 Spring 1989 Article 8
April 1989
The Summary Jury Trial and Toxic Tort Litigation
Stephen J. Wenderoth
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stephen J. Wenderoth, The Summary Jury Trial and Toxic Tort Litigation, 6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 565
(1989)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol6/iss2/8
The Summary Jury Trial and Toxic Tort
Litigation
I. Introduction
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is an increasingly
popular tool of the courts for solving the growing problem of
increased case loads, and the delays and costs inherent in to-
day's litigation. Moreover, ADRs play an important role in at-
torney interactions, permitting them to save their clients the
substantial costs of time, money and publicity that attend
protracted litigation. Their continued use should be
encouraged.
The popularity of ADR can be attributed to its easy ad-
aptation to a variety of situations. An ADR may consist of
private arbitration, a mini trial, the use of a special expert or
master, and since 1980, the summary jury trial.
Unlike the voluntary use of arbitrators, the summary jury
trial is a court-ordered means of dispute resolution. Utilized
to bring about settlement on the eve of a big trial, the "trial"
begins by the judge ordering the parties to present their re-
spective arguments to a six member jury empaneled by the
judge. After a brief preparation period, each attorney presents
his or her case in a one-hour presentation. Following the
presentations, the jury deliberates and renders a verdict. Im-
mediately afterward, the parties are required to enter into ne-
gotiations, hopefully resulting in settlement of the case and
thus avoiding the long, complex and costly trial, which is the
hallmark of toxic tort litigation.'
Part II of this paper will set out the history of the sum-
mary jury trial, its procedural underpinnings, and the proce-
dure itself; initially as defined by Judge Lambros and then as
modified by other district court judges. Part III will define a
1. For a complete discussion of the summary jury trial procedure, see infra notes
19-26 and accompanying text.
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toxic tort, focusing on what distinguishes a "toxic" tort from a
garden variety tort. Part IV of this paper will then discuss the
summary jury trial's utility in effecting settlement between
toxic tort litigants, paying particular attention to the peculiar-
ities of toxic tort litigation raised in Part III. This paper will
conclude that the summary jury trial is a practicable and ef-
fective means to facilitate settlement between toxic tort
litigants.
II. The Summary Jury Trial
A. The History of the Summary Jury Trial
The summary jury trial was the creation of Judge
Thomas D. Lambros, District Judge of the Northern District
of Ohio.2 Confronted with a caseload of over three thousand
cases, Judge Lambros sought a means to reduce this burden
while concurrently dealing with the attorney's imminent ques-
tion: How will a jury view my case? He found the solution in
the summary jury trial.
From the beginning, Judge Lambros did not envision the
summary jury trial replacing a full trial. Rather, its purpose is
to facilitate a settlement between parties, where the only im-
pediment to effecting such a remedy is the disparity between
attorneys as to how a jury would view their case.' If, following
a summary jury trial an attorney refuses to settle and insists
on a full trial, the request will be granted with a de novo re-
view of all materials. It would be as if the summary jury trial
never took place. Such instances have been rare,4 however,
reinforcing the utility of the summary jury trial as a reliable
alternative to classic dispute resolution.
B. Procedural Grounds for the Summary Jury Trial
As a court-ordered device to effect settlement, the sum-
mary jury trial has its roots firmly planted in the Federal
2. JACOUBOVITCH & MOORE, SUMMARY JURY TRIAL IN THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
OHIO 1 (1982).
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 7.
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1
states that the rules of procedure "shall be construed to se-
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action."6 In the effort to accomplish this, Rule 16(a) provides
that "[i]n any action, the court may in its discretion direct the
attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to ap-
pear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for
such purposes as (1) expediting the disposition of the action;.
. [and] (5) facilitating settlement of the case."7 Furthermore,
pursuant to Rule 16(c)(7) "[t]he participants at any confer-
ence ... may consider and take action with respect to ... (7)
the possibility of settlement or the use of extrajudicial proce-
dures to resolve the dispute ... and (11) such other matters as
may aid in the disposition of the action .... "8 Taken literally,
Rules 1 and 16 not only authorize, but encourage development
of ADRs such as the summary jury trial. Indeed, the Northern
District of Ohio has adopted this interpretation by enacting
Local Rule 17.02 which states "[a] Judge may, in his or her
discretion, set any appropriate civil case for Summary Jury
Trial or other alternative method of dispute resolution, as he
or she may choose."9 Because the use of ADRs often dramati-
cally reduce the time necessary to bring a controversy to reso-
lution, their application clearly advances the dictates of the
Federal Rules; to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive de-
termination of every issue."1
In addition to Federal Rule 16, Judge Lambros further
justifies the summary jury trial by analogizing its concept to
that of the advisory jury, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
5. Summary Jury Trial, 103 F.R.D. 461, 469-70 (1984).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(1), (5).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7), (11).
9. Summary Jury Trial, 103 F.R.D. at 470 (quoting Northern District of Ohio
Local Rule 17.02). See also Gwin, Summary Jury Trial: An Explanation and Analy-
sis, Ky. BENCH & BAR 16, 58, 58 n.33 (Wntr. 1988) (noting that Joint Local Rules for
the United States District Court of the Eastern & Western Districts of Kentucky,
Rule 23 and Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District Court
of Indiana, Rule 33, also have provisions for using the summary jury trial).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
19891
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39(c).11 He maintains that the purpose behind the federal rule
is to give the court and counsel the opportunity to "utilize a
jury's particular expertise and perceptions when a case de-
mands those special abilities. ' 12 The summary jury trial,
therefore, closely parallels the advisory jury because it also as-
sists the parties and the court in anticipating how a jury will
perceive the facts of a case. Lastly, Judge Lambros defends
the summary jury trial procedure as being part of a judge's
inherent power to manage his or her own docket."
This rationale establishing a judge's power to order a
summary jury trial is not, however, without criticism. In 1987,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 did not convey
upon a court the power to order a summary jury trial."' The
court construed Federal Rule 16(c) as intending "to foster set-
tlement through the use of extrajudicial procedures,... [but]
not . . . to require that an unwilling litigant be sidetracked
from the normal course of litigation. 1 5 The court ruled that
Federal Rule 16 was not coercive in nature, and thus a court
could not order parties to submit to a summary jury trial. The
court did not rule, however, on the propriety of a court order-
ing a summary jury trial pursuant to its own local court rules.
Nevertheless, despite this ruling, the summary jury trial
continues to be actively used in several jurisdictions. 6 Some
districts, such as Ohio, have local procedural rules which give
a judge discretion to order a summary jury trial,17 while others
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(c) states "(c) ADVISORY JURY AND TRIAL BY CONSENT. In all
actions not triable of right by a jury the court upon motion of its own initiative may
try any issue with an advisory jury . Id. See also Summary Jury Trial, 103
F.R.D. at 470.
12. JACOUBOVITCH, supra note 2, at 41.
13. Id.
14. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Mast-
man, The Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson
County, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988).
15. Strandell, 838 F.2d at 888.
16. See Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 377
(1986) (listing the following states whose district court judges use the summary jury
trial: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, Michigan, and Ohio).
17. See supra note 9.
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continue to rely on Judge Lambros' rationale.18 Regardless of
the source of authority, the summary jury trial continues to
be practiced as a form of alternative dispute resolution.
C. The Summary Jury Trial Procedure
The summary jury trial procedure most often employed
by judges is the one first articulated by Judge Lambros. While
individual judges have adapted the procedure to meet their
particular needs, their basic format is derived from the one
first set out by Judge Lambros."9
The summary jury trial is initiated by a judge and pre-
sided over by the judge or a magistrate of the court. Unless
the parties have been excused from the proceeding, they must
appear with their counsel in court.20 The judge then presents
a ten member jury venire to counsel for consideration. Coun-
sel are provided with a short character profile of each juror
which has been completed by the jurors individually.2' The
profile includes such information as the juror's name and oc-
cupation, the name and occupation of the juror's spouse and
children, the juror's previous knowledge of any of the parties
or counsel in the case as well as the nature of the case, and
any adverse attitudes the juror has toward the nature of the
action. Each attorney is permitted two challenges to arrive at
a final six member jury for the proceeding.
Once the jury is selected, each attorney is given approxi-
mately one hour to describe to the jury his party's view of the
circumstances of the action.2 3 The time allotment for the at-
torney's presentation may be modified in multiparty cases,
however, so that presentations can be offered by more than
18. Other district judges who use Judge Lambros' rationale are Judge McNaught
in Massachusetts, Judge West in Oklahoma, Judges Enslen and Newblatt in Michi-
gan and Judge Shapiro in Pennsylvania, to name a few.
19. The following procedure is adapted from the Jacoubovitch discussion of the
same. See JACOUBOVTCH, supra note 2, at 1-2.
20. Id. at 1. The presence of a court reporter at the summary jury trial is op-
tional. Id.
21. Id. at 1-2.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id.
1989]
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one attorney. In addition, plaintiff's counsel may reserve a
portion of the hour for a statement of refutation following the
presentation by defense counsel.2'
In the summary jury trial, the evidentiary and procedural
rules are few and flexible. Counsel may adduce exhibits for
the jury and may describe the testimony of the witnesses, but
only short passages of depositions may be read aloud.2 5 Fur-
thermore, no witness's testimony may be referred to unless
the reference is based either on the product of a discovery
procedure; on a written, sworn statement of the witness; or on
a sworn affidavit of counsel that the witness would not sign an
affidavit, "that the witness would be called in the event of a
full trial, and that counsel has been told first hand of the sub-
stance of the testimony. '"26
Following the attorneys' presentations, the presiding
judge or magistrate delivers a brief statement of the applica-
ble law to the jury, who then retire to deliberate. Although the
jury is encouraged to return a consensus verdict, it may return
a special report listing each juror's findings on liability and
damages.27 In complex cases, the jury may also be called upon
to make rulings on separate issues. After the verdict or special
report has been rendered, counsel may then meet with the
presiding judge to discuss the verdict and establish a timeta-
ble for settlement negotiations.28
While Judge Lambros' procedure continues to be the one
followed by other judges on the federal circuit, some judges
have begun experimenting with the procedure to make it more
amenable to their particular case load. For example, when
Judge Enslen was confronted with a complicated toxic tort
case in the Stites2" summary jury trial, he found it useful to
convene two juries in the hope of giving counsel a better feel
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Enslen, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Summary Jury Trial in a Toxic
Tort Case, 2 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 1015 (Feb. 17, 1988). See infra note 76 and ac-
companying text.
[Vol. 6
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for the worth of their arguments. Another modification he in-
stituted was permitting the lawyers to argue for up to four
hours each instead of the sixty minute maximum. It was his
belief that the extra time was necessary due to the complexity
of the subject matter. He also permitted the use of video-
taped witnesses as evidence."
There have been other modifications of the summary jury
trial procedure. Judge McNaught firmly enforces the sixty
minute maximum on presentations." He also places a thirty
minute deadline on jury deliberations, and does not allow a
lawyer any challenges to the jury he selects. However, he does
permit a lawyer to utilize his sixty minutes any way he
chooses, including permitting counsel to present witnesses.2
Of course, as with all summary jury trials, there is no cross
examination. Of particular interest is Judge McNaught's prac-
tice of encouraging the attorneys to meet individually with the
jurors after the summary jury trial to ask them questions as to
why they voted the way they did. s This practice can be ex-
tremely useful in assisting lawyers in examining the quality of
their cases, and focusing the direction of the settlement con-
ference. All judges require parties with settlement authority
to attend the summary jury trial and then enter into settle-
ment discussions immediately afterward.
Judge Speigel, who sits with Judge Lambros in the
Northern District of Ohio, has closely adopted Judge Lam-
bros' procedure with one interesting deviation: he asks the
jury to render three verdicts - one on liability, one on dam-
ages, and one on who wins and how much.34 Such an approach
is beneficial to counsel in helping her to understand exactly
30. Id. at 1017.
31. Telephone interview with Judge McNaught's law clerk (December 2, 1988)
[hereinafter McNaught interview].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Speigel, Summary Jury Trials, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 829, 829 (1986). The third
test setting forth who wins and how much, is distinct from the damages test. This
third test asks the juror to perform his traditional role: render a verdict based on the
evidence, and if you find for the plaintiff, determine how much he should be awarded.
The question on damages asks the juror to assume that the defendant is already lia-
ble and then render an opinion solely on the amount to be awarded the plaintiff.
19891
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where the strengths of her case lie. It can also be helpful in
the settlement discussions."
Although some of the current adaptations, such as the
three verdicts used by Judge Speigel and the juror/lawyer
meetings advocated by Judge McNaught, are especially signif-
icant in assisting in settlement and should be encouraged,
others, such as extending the time allowed for presentations,
are best left to those individual cases which require the addi-
tional discussion. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the sum-
mary jury trial procedure is easily amenable to a variety of
situations and settings. The ease with which a judge can ma-
nipulate the time element, the presentation of evidence, and
the degree of juror contact, suggest that the summary jury
trial procedure can be readily adapted to complex toxic tort
litigation.31
III. The Toxic Tort
The concept of tortious conduct 3 7 and one of its later de-
rivatives, product liability law, developed from principles of
early English common law. 38 Although product liability law
was not significantly practiced until the 1960s,39 two decades
later it would become the means by which an individual,
harmed from contact with a chemical substance, would be af-
forded recovery. This is known today as the toxic tort.4
Although the toxic tort is easily defined as "injuries
caused by toxic substances,"41 this definition raises more
questions than it answers. Difficult problems of causation,
novel recovery theories, the awesome complexity of the scien-
tific evidence presented, the long latency periods between ex-
35. See infra text following note 101.
36. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
37. A "tort" is defined as a "legal concept possessing the basic elements of a
wrong with resultant injury and consequential damage which is cognizable in a court
of law." 86 C.J.S. Torts § 1 (1954).
38. See Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M & N 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
39. See 1 SEARCY, A GUIDE TO Toxic TORTS § 1.01 (1988). See also, Hollenshead,
Historical Perspective on Product Liability Reform, 1 J. Prod. L. 75, 79-83 (1982).
40. SEARCY, supra note 39, at § 1.01.
41. Id.
[Vol. 6
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posure and symptom, and intense governmental regulation,
make the toxic tort infinitely more than merely just another
products liability or personal injury case.
A. Recovery Theories
The field of toxic torts has evolved to encompass a wide
variety of causes of action."2 In addition to personal injury,
damage from toxins can be used to recover property and eco-
nomic losses, and can be instituted against a manufacturer,
distributor and an end user of the toxin. 3
The prevalent cause of action in toxic tort litigation is,
however, negligence."" In the toxic tort, negligent conduct is
conduct "which falls below the standard established by law
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of
harm."' 5 The conduct is focused on the increased standard of
care to be applied to the use of toxic chemical substances.'6
Furthermore, this standard of care extends not only to
manufacturers of the chemical, but the distributors, and third
party applicators of the toxins as well.' Moreover, this duty
42. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text. See also DORE, THE LAW OF
Toxic TORTS § 2.02 (1987), and SEARCY supra note 39, at §§ 3.01-3.11; Alcorn, Liabil-
ity Theories for Toxic Torts, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3 (Spr. 1988).
43. See infra note 46.
44. Other toxic tort causes of action can be found by using federal statutes. See
supra note 48. Toxic substances present a potentially grave hazard both to individu-
als and property, and have been the subject of heavy regulation. See SEARCY supra
note 39, at § 3.11. Toxic tort causes of action include toxic trespass [see J. H. Borland
v. Sanders Lead Co. Inc., 369 So.2d 523 (Ala. 1979) and SEARCY note 39, at § 3.05.],
nuisance [see Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc., v. Borough of Medford Lakes, 90
N.J. 582, 449 A.2d 472 (1982) and SEARCY supra note 39, at § 3.06], express and
implied warranties (see Drayton v. Jiffee Chemical Corp., 395 F.Supp. 1081 (N.D.
Ohio 1975) and SEARCY supra note 39, at § 3.08), and strict liability. The theory of
strict liability as applied to toxic tort cases emanates from the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), which held that one who engages in ultrahazardous
activity is strictly liable for the consequences of that activity. W. PROSSER, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 78 (4th ed. 1971). See also Cities Service Co. v. State, 312 So.2d 799 (Fla.
App. 1975) and SEARCY supra note 39, at § 3.07.
45. SEARCY supra note 39, at § 3.02 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
282 (1965)).
46. Id. at § 3.02[1].
47. See, e.g., Knabe v. Nat'l Supply Div. of Armco Steel Corp., 592 F.2d 841 (5th
Cir.) (negligent discharge); Johns Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So.2d 242
9
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of care applies to the manufacturing, labelling, and disposing
of the chemical.4" This widespread accountability means that
a typical toxic tort action could involve a negligence suit
against a manufacturer, its distributor, and possibly the end
user not only for failing to warn the public of any possible
deleterious affects associated with the chemical, but also for
negligence in the use and eventual disposal of the chemical.49
Nevertheless, while this plethora of actions clearly assists
the attorney in getting his client into court, it is, however,
only the most elementary step in achieving a judgment. Inge-
nious as an attorney may be in developing the cause of action,
there still remains the formidable burden of showing
causation.
B. Causation
Proving causation in a toxic tort case involves demon-
strating that there is a redressable injury and determining
who caused it. These simple words belie, however, the enor-
mous difficulties a toxic tort victim has in proving who injured
him. This is due to a variety of factors including the long la-
tency periods involved between exposure and injury,"0 the
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 467 So.2d 999 (1985) (negligent manufacture).
See also FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY § 11.1 (1987).
48. The scope of this far-reaching duty is exemplified by the breadth of federal
legislation in this area. The federal government, recognizing the importance of regu-
lating all phases of a chemical's life, has promulgated several statutes to deal with
this proliferation of toxic substances. Some statutes, such as the Resource Conserva-
tion Recovery Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (1984) are so called cradle-to-grave statutes
designed to regulate the manufacturer § 6922, the labeling § 6924(r), and the disposal
§ 6924, of toxins. Others, such as the Toxic Substances Control Act 15 U.S.C. §§
2601-2654 (1976) are directed at a specific phase of the chemical's life.
49. The litigation surrounding that manufacture and use of asbestos is an excel-
lent example. One of the earliest toxic tort cases, it grew to involve over 16,000 plain-
tiffs in 12,000 cases against more than 250 defendants ranging from corporate giants
like Johns-Manville Corp., to small distributors. These claims where lodged against
manufacturers, Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 463 So.2d 242; sellers, Hammond v.
North American Asbestos Corp., 454 N.E. 2d 210 (Ill. 1983); and distributors Thomas
v. Kaiser Agricultural Chemicals, 81 Ill.2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980). See also, Levy,
The Manville Bankruptcy-Its Special Effect on the Asbestos Industry, SPECIAL
PROBLEMS IN Toxic SUBSTANCE LITIGATION AFTER MANVILLE 1983 9, 11.
50. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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multiplicity of plaintiffs and defendants," etiological con-
cerns, 52 and the morass of conflicting scientific data on the
over 50,000 chemicals currently in use nationwide. 3
Injury due to exposure to a toxic substance is rarely im-
mediate.6 4 Typically, an individual comes into contact with a
substance repeatedly over a number of years, 5 and then, sev-
eral years after the contact ends, develops a disease, notori-
ously cancer. The problems this protracted latency period
presents are readily apparent. Frequently, defendants have
gone out of business or have merged with other companies,"
or the toxin was manufactured by a host of companies and
distributed by twice that number. For example, people can
usually determine who built the car they where riding in when
the gas tank exploded, 7 or what company's soda was in the
bottle that exploded. 58 Contrast this with the fact that over
two hundred companies manufactured diethylstilbestrol
(DES), 59 and that hundreds of industries have used and dis-
posed of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).6 0 In a toxic tort
suit it is not atypical for defendants to consist of manufactur-
ers, distributors, and users, with the number of potential de-
fendants running into the hundreds.
51. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
54. However, a tragic example of an "immediate effect" resulting from a toxic
spill is exemplified by the Bhopal, India disaster involving a leak of the chemical
methyl isocyanate by a Union Carbide plant.
55. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (where Vietnam veterans, exposed to a herbicide containing dioxin
from 1962-1971, brought a toxic tort suit against the government and manufacturers
of dioxin in 1979 for injuries manifesting themselves several years after leaving
Vietnam.)
56. See, e.g., SEARCY supra note 39, at § 24.04[2] (discussing this problem rela-
tive to the extensive litigation surrounding the use of diethylstilbestrol (DES)).
57. See Turcotte v. Ford Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
58. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944).
59. See Martin v. Abbott Labs., 102 Wash.2d 581, 589, 689 P.2d 368, 374 (1984).
60. Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) are hydrocarbon chemicals useful in many
industrial processes and are highly toxic to a widr .ariety of species, including man.
For a complete discussion of PCBs and its legal involvement, See SEARCY supra note
39, at §§ 33.01-33.99.
19891
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In addition to the problems of latency and multiple par-
ties, there is also the etiological uncertainty surrounding the
alleged harm. For example, there is the question of degree of
exposure: How many times does an individual have to come in
contact with the defoliant Agent Orange before they contract
dioxin poisoning?61 Moreover, there is the uncertainty sur-
rounding the actual injury itself. The relative paucity of medi-
cal information on cancer generally, coupled with the more
specific problem of whether a particular chemical can actually
cause the particular type of cancer exhibited by the plaintiff,
highlight the etiological difficulties attendant toxic tort
litigation."2
A corollary to the etiological issue is the overwhelming
scientific hurdle which must be overcome to show a nexus be-
tween a chemical substance and the alleged harm. Integral to
demonstrating this nexus is the attorney's ability to clearly in-
terpret and explain a morass of very complicated evidence.
Complex data is not, of course, unique to chemical sub-
stance litigation. Products liability and medical malpractice
claims also place the practitioner in the role of a science
teacher to the jury. The distinction in a toxic tort case, how-
ever, is that the theories involved are frequently on the cut-
ting edge of scientific knowledge and investigation.63 Thus,
when counsel presents his case, it typically involves not only
utilizing a host of experts from a dozen different disciplines,
but requires them to explain everything from simple physics
to the latest epidemiological study. 4
61. See "Agent Orange", 597 F.Supp. at 787-799.
62. See SEARCY supra note 39, at § 10.02[3].
63. See, e.g., Society of Plastics Indus. Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
64. Epidemiological studies are defined as "the study of the distribution and the
determinants of disease frequency and occurrence in humans." DORE, supra note 42,
at § 25.01. Each of these studies involve a variety of methods, analytical techniques
and valuative schemes, and can be disturbed by confounding, selection, information,
or reporting biases. Id. at § 25.02[4]. See also Wong, Using Epidemiology to Deter-
mine Causation in Disease, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 20 (Spr. 1988).
This problem of dealing with complex scientific data which often results from
esoteric, conflicting, and unestablished principles of science, highlights the manifest
importance of the expert on the witness stand and the need to have him present
[Vol. 6
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The toxic tort case then can be summed up as a host of
actions, brought by many plaintiffs against multiple defend-
ants, involving difficult issues of causation, to prove a vaguely
defined and understood harm, from a mass of complex, con-
flicting often recently discovered data. 5 Accordingly, once the
practitioner has amassed all her information over years of dis-
covery, she is then ready to proceed to trial, against a defense
counsel equally well prepared to show that his client is inno-
cent of any wrongdoing. It necessarily follows that the result-
ing trial will involve significant expenditures of resources of
time and money from the attorneys, their clients, and the
court. Logic dictates that any effort to avoid this protracted
litigation should be explored, in an attempt to bring about a
settlement, including the summary jury trial.
IV. The Summary Jury Trial and Toxic Torts
A. Considerations of Time and Experts and the Need to
Balance
Inevitably, toxic tort litigation is protracted and expen-
sive.6 Primary testimony generally involves a myriad of ex-
perts, including physicians, epidemiologists, toxicologists, and
pathologists. Moreover, the nature of the evidence presented
by these witnesses is typically complex scientific theories and
hypothesis. Because it is difficult to simplify this testimony
into language a lay jury can understand, often weeks of expert
testimony are necessary to convince the jury of the soundness
and logic of a particular viewpoint.6 7
testimony of the most reliable and believable nature.
65. The above discussion is only a brief outline of what exactly is a toxic tort.
For an exhaustive study of the subject, see Margie Searcy's three volume treatise
cited repeatedly throughout this section. SEARCY supra note 39.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F.Supp. 11 (D.C. Minn.
1974), stayed 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), modified 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975) (120
days of trial); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. Federal Power Commission, 354
F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966) and 453 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972), followed by 330 N.Y.2d 71 (1972), 498 F.2d
827 (2d Cir. 1974), 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974), 587 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1978).
67. Id. See also SEARCY supra note 39, at § 32.01, discussing the case of Boggess
v. Monsanto Co., which was at trial for eleven months.
1989]
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The summary jury trial limits this plethora of scientific
gobbledegook to approximately one-half day of testimony.
This results in savings to all parties in terms of time and
money. Most importantly for the court, jury expenses are sig-
nificantly reduced, and valuable court time is made available
to affect the speedy trial of those cases more deservedly re-
quiring a full trial. 8 Moreover, if the summary jury trial re-
sults in settlement, the plaintiffs can be compensated more
immediately for an injury which has in all likelihood gone un-
redressed for several years. 9
As for the defendant corporation, settlement means man-
agement can stop using its valuable time preparing for litiga-
tion and get back to the business of running the company.
Moreover, management saves the huge costs, sometimes in the
millions of dollars, that accompany long toxic tort litigation;
the company is able to release previously tied up resources,
such as other personnel and facilities, that were involved in
assisting in the defense of the corporation; and the corpora-
tion avoids much of the publicity, usually unfavorable, which
attends a toxic tort claim. Bad publicity cannot only result in
additional claims, but can also manifest itself in the market-
place as consumers react against the alleged "big bad
conglomerate."
The time constraints are not, however, all positive. The
major criticism is that in the interests of time, witnesses are
generally not used. The only evidence presented is that which
is summarized in the attorney's statement to the jury.
Problems with this aspect of the summary jury trial are read-
ily apparent. In a toxic tort case, the evidence that will be
presented is primarily complex scientific data.70 Moreover, the
nature of this testimony by scientists and doctors runs the
gamut from established theories to relatively untested epide-
miological studies. Central to the jury's accurately interpret-
68. See generally JACOUBOVITCH, supra note 2.
69. The alternative, lengthy trials coupled with multiple appeals and remands,
can be so overwhelming as to suggest the summary jury trial (or another form of
ADR) should be mandatorily imposed upon the parties before embarking on a full
trial.
70. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
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ing this evidence is the paramount need for the jury to assess
the credibility of the experts, and of having all this complex
material clearly explained to the jury in lay terms. 71
Credibility of the experts is paramount to a toxic tort liti-
gant's case. Because so many of the scientists' findings are on
the frontier of medical and scientific technology, theories
which the jury determines are most credible are the ones they
will most likely accept as scientific fact. Accordingly, the party
who puts forth the most trustworty experts stands the clearest
chance of winning. One can readily see how important the
ability to call these witnesses is, as well as allowing the "test-
ing" of their demeanor, clarity, and strength under cross ex-
amination. Attorneys have argued it is this absence of cross
examination in the summary jury trial which prohibits a party
from carrying forth its burden and prevents the jury from ac-
curately resolving the dispute.72
In addition to credibility is the need to clearly explain the
complex data inherent in all toxic tort suits. There are ques-
tions about a chemical's makeup, its properties in its various
states, its ability to move through the environment, and its
effect if ingested, breathed, or absorbed into the human body.
Medical recoveries for cancerphobia and enhanced risk belie
the simple analysis of whether the plaintiff has suffered a cog-
nizable injury. Information relative to these issues, pivotal to
counsel's case, are normally presented by a myriad of experts
using language from a dozen different disciplines. Critics of
the summary jury trial argue that it is unlikely that the aver-
age jury can accurately understand, interpret and extrapolate
a liability determination from this information without first,
hearing it, and then second, having it carefully dissected and
explained by the lawyers and their experts during a full trial.73
Admittedly the abbreviated procedures of the summary
jury trial will never permit the detailed analysis and examina-
tion that a full trial presents, and, perhaps on very compli-
71. Zatz, 2 Toxics L. REP. 929 (BNA) (Jan. 27, 1988).
72. BNA Analysis, Summary Jury Trial Assailed as Inaccurate and Ineffective,
2 Toxics L. REP. 1189, 1190 (BNA) (Mar. 30, 1988) [hereinafter Analysis].
73. See supra note 72, at 1190.
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cated issues, a neutral master/expert may be more appropri-
ate. " ' However, when the facts and issues of a case can be
sufficiently narrowed to a question of proximate causation75 or
one of damages, the summary jury trial is an acceptable alter-
native to classic dispute resolution.
A good example is the Stites76 summary jury trial engi-
neered by Judge Enslen of the Eastern District of Michigan.
The parties in that case had agreed prior to the summary jury
trial that the contamination emanated from the defendant.
The issues were narrowed to that of proximate causation and
to the amount of damages to be afforded the plaintiffs.7 Due
to the complexity of the material, Judge Enslen held the sum-
mary jury trial over a two day period, with two separate ju-
ries.7 8 The juries reached opposite conclusions. Nevertheless,
the summary jury trial resulted in settlement, saving the par-
ties an estimated six months to one year of trial and over
three million dollars in litigation fees; as well as saving the
court one-half of its calendar time and significant jury
expenses.79
It must be noted that some of the jurors polled afterward
said that they had difficulty in distinguishing among the many
experts and understanding the highly complex data. However,
one must also ask whether after one hundred days of this kind
of testimony, would the lay person in a full trial be any better
74. See infra note 93, 105.
75. For example, where the defendants are known and a chemical has been iso-
lated so that the issue boils down to whether this chemical caused the plaintiff's
injury.
76. See Enslen, supra note 29. In 1984, the defendant, Sundstrand Heat and
Transfer Co., located near Dowagiac, Michigan was sued by 29 individuals for alleg-
edly contaminating their wells with tetrachlorethylene. The complaints generally con-
sisted of dizziness, cramping, skin rashes, learning disabilities, and cancerphobia. The
company was self- insured and wanted to settle the case, but could not come to terms
on the amount of damages. Defense counsel had already spent two full years on case
and $2.5 million, while plaintiffs noted that they had spent $750,000. Both parties
anticipated spending over a year in actual litigation and incurring costs in excess of
$3 Million. Faced with this daunting prospect, and having already spent two years on
the case, both parties requested Judge Enslen to hold a summary jury trial.
77. Id. at 1016.
78. Id.
79. Id. See also Zatz, supra note 71.
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at understanding such esoteric concepts as man rems per can-
cer and mutagenicity8° or distinguishing between animal bio-
assays and cohort studies.8 1 Furthermore, it can be realisti-
cally argued that presentation of this material in a summary
jury trial, although brief, provides a more realistic appraisal of
the evidence because all the emotional, opinion-laden testi-
mony typical of a full trial, which can just as easily confuse as
clarify, is absent.
Engaging in time honored cost-benefit analysis, on the
one hand there are the benefits of saving huge amounts of
time and money, on the other hand, is the abbreviated presen-
tation of evidence and the loss of extended live witness testi-
mony. Though the latter can be very important (and in some
cases involving multiple parties and novel issues of causation
and recovery indispensable) it is submitted that most cases
can be adequately summarized within the summary jury
trial's allotted time. After all, the summary jury trial is not a
replacement for a full trial; it is a device to effect settlement.
Accordingly, it is only essential that the jury have a basic un-
derstanding of the parties' positions, and not a formidable
grasp of geophysical properties and chemical structure.
B. Continued Cost-Benefit Analysis in Support of the Sum-
mary Jury Trial
A corollary to the expert-credibility dilemma is that in
the interest of time, no witnesses are presented. Plaintiffs'
counsel have complained of the sterility of the proceeding and
the loss of their ability to present witnesses and cross examine
others.2 The short answer to this problem is that the sum-
mary jury trial is only designed to achieve settlement. If the
jury comes back with a liability verdict in favor of the plain-
tiff, for example, a skillful plaintiff's attorney, by comparing
her case to similar cases, can present evidence during subse-
80. Wilson & Crouch, Risk Assessment and Comparisons: An Introduction, 236
Sci. 267, 270 (Apr. 1987).
81. Lecture by Professor Jeffrey Miller, Pace Univ. Sch. of Law (Jan. 31, 1989).
82. This is not surprising in that the amount of damages awarded frequently
depends heavily on the emotional impact witnesses make upon the jury.
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quent negotiation to suggest approximately how much the in-
jury is worth."
Defense counsel were also concerned about the inability
to object and cross examine. They maintained that it "gave
the plaintiffs carte blanche to present whatever arguments
and versions of the facts they chose, regardless of whether
they would have been admissible at trial. '84 They argued that
this loss of the right to object resulted in there being no break
in the momentum of the trial. Plaintiffs, they contend, were
thus afforded four hours of uninterrupted closing before de-
fense could say a word. 5 As a result, defendant's counsel
"feared that it was too late to restore ... [their] credibility.""
Although this is a realistic concern, it should not overshadow
the fact that defendants also have the same four hours. More-
over, defense counsel is the last to argue. Thus, their rebuttal
is fresh in the minds of the jury when the jury begins to
deliberate.
Another criticism of the summary jury trial is that law-
yers, for fear of revealing their trial strategy, will hold back
from fully developing their case.8 7 This philosophy of "hedg-
ing one's bet" should not, however, be a bar to the summary
jury trial. A lawyer who practices this deception is from the
start ignoring the settlement potential of the summary jury
trial. This attitude does a disservice not only to the lawyer's
client, by making a protracted, expensive trial inevitable, but
also to the bar by openly flouting judicial attempts to manage
their docket so as to be able to hear more cases.
Attorneys are not the only critics of the summary jury
trial. Judge Richard Posner feels the summary jury trial is a
"lavish" technique because the judge spends one entire day
83. Judge Speigel has addressed this concern in his paper on the summary jury
trial. He counsels that the jury should return three verdicts: one on liability, another
on damages, and a third on who wins and how much. Of course it must be noted that
a verdict for defendant may give plaintiff's counsel no choice but to go to trial on the
merits if defendant then refuses to settle. However, such cases have rarely occurred.
See generally Speigel, supra note 34.
84. Zatz, supra note 71, at 933.
85. Id. at 934.
86. Id.
87. See Analysis, supra note 72, at 1191.
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settling a case.88 This analysis weakens considerably, however,
when one considers not only the vast amount of time taken up
if these cases go to trial, but also the ability of a magistrate to
hear a summary jury trial in place of a judge. On the contrary,
rather than being "lavish," the summary jury trial frees the
judge to hear more of those cases which truly warrant a full
trial. 9
C. Is the Summary Jury Trial Appropriate for the Toxic
Tort
Judge Posner's criticism does, however, reflect the com-
mon tendency to compare the summary jury trial to a full
fledged trial. The summary jury trial is not meant to replace
the full trial; it is one device among many designed to affect
settlement between parties.
1. Other Choices
The oldest form of ADR, and coincidentally the most uni-
versally accepted, is mediation. Defined as "bring[ing] . . .
parties together to discuss settlement under the auspices of a
neutral third party," 90 mediation is more than an independent
ADR method; its mechanism for dispute resolution - presen-
tation of a case before a neutral third party - is central to
almost all ADRs. This is not to imply, however, that all ADRs
are the same. They are distinguishable first, by the circum-
stances surrounding the appointment of the neutral advisor,
and second, by the rules which guide the mediator. For exam-
ple, the mini trial9' and private judging92 are initiated and
88. Id. at 1189.
89. Ranii, Summary Jury Trials Gain Favor, NAT'L L.J. (June 10, 1985) 1, 30.
Judge Posner's criticism of the summary jury trial is not shared by several of his
brethren sitting on district courts. Judge Lambros reported that as of April, 1985, all
but seven of 131 cases he assigned for summary jury trial have settled. Judge West of
Oklahoma shares this enthusiasm. Of the 30 summary jury trials that he has held,
only four did not settle. Id. at 30.
90. Summary Jury Trial, 103 F.R.D. 461, 466 (1984).
91. Id. at 467. The mini trial, used primarily by corporate litigants involved in
commercial disputes, is a private trial conducted by a neutral mediator, hired by the
parties. The action is voluntary, held outside of court and can take a variety of forms,
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controlled by the individual parties involved in the litigation.
However, a neutral expert/master s or a summary jury trial"
are initiated and monitored by the court pursuant to court-
fashioned rules. Regardless of the method chosen, all are in-
tended to result in settlement, thereby eliminating the need
for a long, protracted and costly trial. The particular advan-
tage the summary jury trial has over other methods in accom-
plishing this, is that the summary jury trial most nearly dupli-
cates an actual trial. Because of this feature, though the
arguments marshalled against its use in a complex toxic tort
suit are formidable, they fail to remove the summary jury trial
as one of a judge's most useful alternatives to classic dispute
resolution.
2. The Toxic Tort and Summary Jury Trial Revisited
This paper has outlined primarily four arguments against
using the summary jury trial in toxic tort litigation. First, the
toxic tort case is extremely complex from the viewpoint of the
evidence presented. Typically experts are attempting to ex-
plain a chemical's makeup, its use in agriculture or industry,
its properties in its discarded state, and its effects on the
human body. Furthermore, there are the issues of whether the
company knew of the hazards of the toxin when it was re-
leased into the environment and whether the company con-
formed to government regulations in the manufacture or dis-
posal of the toxin. Finally, there are often novel issues of
causation and injury. As discussed earlier, both sides to the
dispute will typically engage a myriad of experts in an effort
to answer these questions. Thus the role of the jury becomes
pivotal in deciding which set of experts are more believable,
including utilization of a private jury.
92. Id. at 466. Private judging is another voluntarily undertaken ADR. Parties
hire a third party and then present an abbreviated version of their cases to the pri-
vate judge.
93. Id. at 467. Neutral experts/masters are generally appointed by the court to
hear complex cases involving detailed scientific evidence. They are touted for their
ability to accurately sift through the mass of technological data to determine liability
and damages.
94. See supra notes 18-29 and accompanying text.
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and hence, who is liable."5
Second, it is suggested that where a case depends so
heavily on the testimony and credibility of witnesses, the ab-
breviated procedures of the summary jury trial are inappro-
priate. Indeed, Judge Lambros reinforces this conclusion when
he notes that where the credibility of witnesses are central to
the determination of a case, use of the summary jury trial is
inappropriate."
Third, toxic tort cases rarely involve only one plaintiff.
The rule appears to be multiple plaintiffs with varying inju-
ries - both in type and degree. This not only exacerbates the
problems of causation and scope of liability, but presents the
added problem of apportioning the damages if there is a
settlement.9 7
Lastly, there is the issue of active governmental involve-
ment in the area of toxins.98 Because of the heavy regulation
in this area, any litigation is bound to involve important mat-
ters of public policy. Problems arise where a manufacturer's
defense may lie in its alleged conformance to government re-
quirements. More significantly, a court may have to make a
threshold determination of whether a government provision is
constitutional or not before deciding whether liability exists.99
Although the aforementioned criticisms represent viable
concerns to the practitioner, they are not adequate reasons for
throwing out the summary jury trial as a settlement device.
The summary jury trial's usefulness is in facilitating settle-
ment. It is designed to afford counsel and their clients a brief
glimpse into the minds of the jury, and how lay persons will
view their arguments, not replace a full trial. As a result,
counsel must approach the summary jury trial with an eye to-
95. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
96. JACOUBOVITCH, supra note 2, at 3; see supra text following note 70.
97. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. See, e.g., In re "Agent Or-
ange" Product Liability Litigation, 597 F.Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Snyder v.
Hooker & Plastics Chemical Corp., 104 Misc. 2d 735, 429 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1980).
98. See supra note 48, See also Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Pan-
acea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv 668 (1986).
99. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding a
New Jersey statute prohibiting the import of toxic waste unconstitutional).
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ward settlement, not trial. If one views the summary jury trial
in this fashion, one finds that many of the criticisms offered
against the summary jury trial can be accommodated by the
summary jury trial's adaptable procedures. For example, the
problems of complexity0 0 and multiple parties can be dealt
with by adopting extended time for the presentations and us-
ing video and live testimony.
Another change in procedure which would alleviate criti-
cism is widespread implementation of Judge Speigel's three
verdict requirement. This technique provides a lawyer with a
clearer picture of the strength of her argument. For example,
if a summary jury finds a defendant liable, but awards the
plaintiff minimal damages, this puts the plaintiff on notice
that while the facts may be on her side, there are important
elements, possibly of scienter or scope of injury that are al-
igned against her. Likewise, this finding makes defense coun-
sel wary of the vulnerable position he could be placed in when
surrounded by all the emotional trappings inherent in a full
trial. Clearly it would be in the best interest of both parties to
settle. Of course, if one party overwhelmingly wins on both
counts, the loser will be appreciably more receptive to the
winner's offers in the settlement discussions following the
summary jury trial.
Thus, it is apparent that the criticisms are not sufficient
to justify throwing out the summary jury trial as an alterna-
tive to traditional dispute resolution. While the summary jury
trial lacks a great deal of the emotion and classic courtroom
confrontation, it does permit parties, with a minimal effort, to
see how a jury will view their case. This is true even when
faced with the complex issues and evidence inherent in most
toxic tort litigation. The summary jury trial is still an appro-
priate alternative to traditional dispute resolution.
V. Conclusion
So where does this leave us? One cannot dispute the fact
100. For a detailed discussion of the complexity issue, see supra notes 61-65 and
accompanying text.
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that settlement saves the parties valuable time and money,
compensates the victims more quickly, and reduces a court's
already unmanageable docket.
When the toxic tort action before the court involves not
only complex and novel theories of causation and recovery,
but also multiple defendants and plaintiffs, there are valid
reasons for resorting to a neutral expert/master to get a third
party opinion. Appointed by the court pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 706, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, or
through the inherent power of the court,' 0 ' the mediators se-
lected are experts in their fields. Accordingly, as experts, they
can analyze the vast amounts of conflicting scientific evidence
to determine causation amongst defendants and calculate the
damages arguably more efficiently than a lay jury. Judge Lam-
bros has used special masters to assist him in establishing ef-
fective case management for approximately 100 asbestos re-
lated actions in his district.10 2
However, complexity alone does not remove a toxic tort
case from the purview of a summary jury trial. There is very
little reason to suggest that one hour of scientific presentation
will be any more confusing than 120 days of it.'- Further-
more, techniques such as Judge Speigel's request that a jury
give three verdicts - one on liability, one on damages, and a
third on who wins and how much - enables counsel to quickly
and accurately assess how his evidence has been viewed objec-
tively by a jury. Combining this with Judge Enslen's ex-
panded time for presentation and Judge McNaught's use of
live witnesses, will hopefully reduce an attorney's skepticism
concerning the reliability of the jury's verdict.""
101. Summary Jury Trial 103 F.R.D. 461, 466 (1984). FED. R. EvID. 706, FED. R.
Civ. P. 53.
102. Id. at 467.
103. Enslen, supra note 29.
104. The strength of the summary jury trial lies in its ability to accurately pre-
dict the outcome of a real trial. For example, in Chicago, Illinois in 1985, Judge
Kocoras of the United States District Court conducted a summary jury trial in an
antitrust case that resulted in a verdict of $27 million for the plaintiff. The two sides
were not able to reach a settlement and the case went to trial. After a seven week
trial, the jury returned a verdict of $24 million. Furthermore, Judges West and Rus-
sell each have had two cases that went to trial after an SJT and, in all four instances,
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There are no bright line answers to the questions and
problems raised in this paper. As a tool to facilitate settle-
ment, the summary jury trial procedure can be extremely
helpful where settlement discussions are stagnated because of
counsels' uncertainty as to how a jury will view their case.
Although there are instances owing to the uniqueness of
the fact pattern where a summary jury trial may not be ap-
propriate, its proven effectiveness in complex cases support its
continued use. This is especially true in .the toxic tort arena
where trials often extend over many months. Surely expend-
ing one-half to two days in an effort to affect a settlement and
thus save the court, counsel, and client the tremendous outlay
of resources a full trial would warrant, is worthy of the attor-
ney's and judge's cooperation. It is hoped that the use of sum-
mary jury trials will be continued and promoted.
Stephen J. Wenderoth
the advisory verdicts were entirely consistent with the juries' dispositions following
full-scale trials ...
Such experiences, Judge Russell says, lend 'a lot of credibility to the ability of a
[SJT] jury to assess a case in a short period.' Ranii, supra note 89, at 30.
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